Infantry soldiers serve at the front lines, but often receive the least attention during training. To qualify as a rifleman (MOS 100), they must complete the basic military training (BMT), usually referred to as “bootcamp.”

Initially designed for peacetime, the program lasted three months. During the large-scale invasion, however, it was shortened to 30 days, during which future soldiers must be taught the basics of military affairs. 

These people are mostly yesterday's civilians, and they are bearing the brunt of Ukraine's defense in the current war. At the same time, the average age of those mobilized has risen significantly—many cadets in training centers are over 45-50 years old. And although not all of them will end up in the infantry, and many will still undergo professional training, for the majority, BMT is the only formal training before deployment to the combat zone.

The challenges facing training centers and the military training system as a whole are increasingly gaining attention on social media and in both Ukrainian and international media. In a recent interview, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, acknowledged that soldiers are not receiving as much training as he would prefer. The fast-paced nature of combat operations often forces mobilized soldiers to be deployed to the frontline sooner than ideal.

In response, the General Staff has begun deliberating on extending the training period and establishing a School of Instructors to develop a new cadre of highly skilled trainers.

How long should training last, and which disciplines should be prioritized? These questions are currently at the center of professional debate. Recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach to basic military training, analysts from the CBA Initiatives Center conducted a study to identify the challenges recruits face during this critical phase of the war.

In early November, the basic military training period was extended from 30 to 45 days. However, it is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this change. For this reason, our analysis focuses on the training experience of cadets within the original 30-day framework.

We conducted a qualitative study that included in-depth interviews and mobile ethnography and talked to over fifty respondents representing 5 distinctive groups, namely:

• direct participants of the combat training;
• instructors and commanders of training units (as part of military units) of training centers;
• deputy brigade commanders for combat training and instructors of brigade training units;
• servicemen who have completed the BCT within the last six months and already have experience in combat units;
• experts in the field of education, training and educational theory in general.

We selected these groups to examine the training system's challenges from perspectives beyond just those of training center cadets.

The issues with BMT go beyond just timing or the program itself. The primary concern is that it is, in practice, not being fully implemented. This problem is multifaceted, involving a cascade of difficulties:

• training time is planned and used inefficiently;
• Instead of training, cadets are regularly involved in non-core work (including kitchen duties, etc.) and rudimentary practices (e.g., formations);
• training is slowed down by a lack of resources, material resources, and proper living and accommodation conditions for recruits;
• there are not enough instructors, they are unmotivated, tired, unprepared and overwhelmed by the number of recruits they have to train.

However, the most significant challenges stem from intangible factors—human attitudes, communication, and feedback—which play a crucial role in both motivation and the effectiveness of BMT. These aspects are often lacking.

We have identified three main categories of barriers to improving training: tangible factors, intangible factors, and issues related to inefficient processes and procedures. This framework enables us to propose targeted changes to the BMT program, addressing each segment step by step.

A study by the CBA Initiatives Center shows that recruits do not feel ready to perform combat missions after completing the course. This was confirmed by deputy brigade commanders for combat training. Here are quotes from three different “nachboys” from different combat brigades:

“The training is very poor, because the personnel come untrained".

“The BMT does not train a sh*t”.

“There is no such graduate of the BMT program who is well trained.”

It is the deputy brigade commanders for combat training and brigade instructors of training (reserve) units who have direct contact with new recruits and are responsible for the additional training of personnel. In addition, they know the real situation on the battlefield, which allows them to assess how well the training received in the center aligns with the current challenges faced by the Defense Forces on the front lines.

The cadets themselves told us in interviews that their motivation declined throughout the entire BMT. One of our respondents, who voluntarily joined the Armed Forces, remarked, “This fcking 'bootcamp' fcks even the most motivated.”

Quality training is impossible without motivation, and poor training can diminish even the strongest motivation. Unsuprisingly, everyday life and hygiene are key factors in killing motivation. These concerns often reflect how the state treats cadets. Living conditions are typically the main basis for evaluating the BMT, as recruits compare their civilian lives with their military experience.

Being able to shower, wash clothes, maintain personal hygiene, and have proper living conditions is the bare minimum that allows cadets to focus on their training. This also helps prevent illnesses or infections that could disrupt training for extended periods.

We also talked to cadets who had undergone BMT in the UK and Italy. According to them, proper conditions and a positive human attitude were crucial for them for focusing on the learning. 

Procedural issues, such as long waits and the time spent moving around the training center, also negatively impact motivation.

As a result, although the program is designed for 10 hours of training per day, only a few of those hours are dedicated to meaningful instruction. The rest of the time is spent traveling between the residence, meal areas, weapons storage, and training locations. In other words, even in a 30-day course, most of the time is not spent on actual training.

Another issue is that cadets often have no clear understanding of what is happening or what will happen during the BMT. They typically learn the daily schedule only after waiting on the parade ground, when officers finally announce the plan for the day.

Extending the program's duration alone is unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes. While more time may allow cadets to adapt, it does not necessarily improve the quality of training.

Developing an effective curriculum is very challenging. The primary task now is to create a training program that aligns with Ukraine's capabilities and meets military needs. In other words, it is crucial to strike a balance between available resources—both material and human—and the training objectives.

The focus should be on revising the approaches to program implementation and providing training centers with adequate resources. The goal is to create the most favorable conditions for effective training within the constraints of the existing environment.

The CBA Initiatives Center team will present a comprehensive study on BCT issues in December this year, which will be made available to the public.