Today, on January 20, 2025, Donald Trump assumes office as the 47th President of the United States, marking his second tenure in the Oval Office. Along with inheriting the responsibilities of his predecessor, Joe Biden, Trump faces the pressing challenge of resolving the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. To achieve this, the new administration must navigate a web of complex contradictions and forceful compromises. Otherwise, the "Quartet of Chaos" may continue to destabilize Eurasia's security architecture.

The administration of the 46th President leaves behind a mixed record in managing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which escalated into a full-scale war on February 24, 2022. On the one hand, the United States and its allies thwarted Russia’s ambitions of quickly achieving its maximalist goals: the obliteration of Ukraine’s sovereignty through occupation and projecting power across Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Russia has neither abandoned its objectives nor ceased its aggression, despite significant direct and indirect losses. For the Biden administration, these losses represented a "strategic failure for Russia" that could eventually compel the Kremlin to recalibrate its plans. Yet Moscow has returned to openly declaring its maximalist demands, which, if realized, would spell the end of a sovereign and independent Ukraine. The war has become a grinding conflict of attrition, posing significant challenges for Ukraine in terms of effective conduct and resolution while exacerbating its economic and humanitarian crises. The Biden administration leaves the war’s outcome unresolved, handing the Trump team a narrative with an open ending—one they must now shape according to their own skills, vision, and priorities.

William Burns, the outgoing CIA Director, indirectly acknowledged the incomplete nature of Biden’s legacy. In a January 10, 2025, interview with NPR, he remarked: “...The issue, I think, is going to be how do you help President Zelenskyy and Ukraine sustain enough leverage to ensure that those negotiations are not just on Putin's terms. And how do you continue to inflict costs on Russia so that Putin understands that time is not necessarily on his side, which is what I think he believes today?” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was more blunt, stating that Ukraine is “not yet in a position to negotiate from strength.” According to Rutte, the Alliance and its partners must do more to shift the conflict’s trajectory and enable Ukraine to achieve a position of strength.

In its final days, the Biden administration floated an intriguing idea regarding the war: all the Trump administration needs to do is maintain existing support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia until the Kremlin agrees to negotiate instead of dictating terms. In doing so, the Trump team could claim the laurels for resolving the conflict, leveraging the groundwork laid by their predecessors. Whether this idea bears fruit remains to be seen. Though the originality of the authors’ attempts to appropriately persuade Donald Trump and his team cannot be denied.

The Trump administration and Donald Trump himself face three core demands to effectively address the Russia-Ukraine war and achieve a lasting resolution. However, these demands may clash with Trump’s personal style, views, and governing approach.

First, the U.S. must continue supporting Ukraine in the immediate term, stabilizing the front lines. Without this, negotiations with Russia are implausible, as the Kremlin sees little reason to negotiate while it believes it can advance militarily and create new realities on the ground. Trump’s prior statements about rapid conflict resolution and the skepticism among Republican voters about sustained support for Ukraine—67% believe the U.S. is providing too much aid—pose significant obstacles. While Trump’s team has suggested it could take 3–6 months to establish a political framework for negotiations, addressing Republican voter concerns will likely prove more challenging.

Second, U.S. support for Ukraine must extend beyond immediate needs, ensuring long-term security guarantees. This entails integrating Ukraine into Europe’s collective defense system to signal to Moscow that violating the new status quo will come at a high cost. Ideally, this would lead to Russia’s complete abandonment of its policy to demolish or subjugate Ukraine. While Ukraine sees NATO membership as a critical goal, Trump and some in his administration are known for their skepticism about European security priorities and NATO’s contemporary role.

Third, any successful resolution requires consistency, predictability, and cooperation with allies—qualities Trump may struggle with. He perceives consistency and predictability as weaknesses, as evidenced by the example of the Biden administration, which took these traits to the extreme. Effective collaboration with partners in Eurasia is vital to countering the "Quartet of Chaos" (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea). However, Trump’s previous statements regarding Canada, Greenland, and Panama do not inspire optimism, although they should not be taken literally.

Therefore, to achieve a durable resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump must, above all, overcome his own impulses.

As of January 20, 2025, Donald Trump and his future administration has provided little clarity on how they plan to resolve the largest European conflict since World War II, where Ukraine’s and Russia’s positions remain mutually exclusive. This lack of detail has fueled a wave of speculation ranging from undue optimism to unwarranted pessimism.

However, during Senate confirmation hearings on January 16, 2025, Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, offered a glimpse into their approach. He emphasized that the war can only end through a political settlement rather than a decisive military victory by either side. Rubio also suggested that a resolution would require concessions not just from Ukraine and Russia but also from the U.S.

This focus on compromise—where parties relinquish maximalist demands while securing key priorities—reflects a less resource-intensive approach than pursuing a settlement based solely on military strength and threats.

At present, Ukraine and Russia’s positions diverge on three key issues: territorial control, Ukraine’s relationship with NATO and international partners, and the future size and capabilities of Ukraine’s armed forces. Currently, Russia demands recognition of its occupation of 19% of Ukraine’s territory and seeks to limit Ukraine’s military to 50,000–75,000 troops with reduced offensive capabilities less than 40 km. If these conditions are implemented, they will make Ukraine completely defenseless and allow the continuation of its destruction. Ukraine, unsurprisingly, refuses to accept such terms and continues to resist despite worsening conditions.

While no space for compromise currently exists, it is worth exploring how the Trump administration might approach these issues.

Concerning territorial disputes, Ukraine has hinted at a willingness to consider political-diplomatic means to restore lost territories. Russia’s claims will ultimately be confined to areas under its real territorial control. Therefore, fully stabilizing the front line is critically important. At the same time, Ukraine will never legally agree to the loss of its territories, while Russia will demand formal recognition of the new territorial status quo. The U.S. will search for formulations acceptable to both sides, which will not be an easy task. Moreover, Washington will have to account for the fact that any formal recognition of the occupation would signify the ultimate collapse of the UN Charter. Another pressing issue will be securing the new line of demarcation, which, to ensure its durability, will require deploying contingents from Ukraine’s partner countries within the Ramstein framework.

When it comes to NATO, the most the U.S. might offer is a temporary moratorium on the Alliance's expansion, as previously mentioned in American media reports. Other options—such as NATO unilaterally abandoning its open-door policy or Ukraine voluntarily adopting neutral status—appear to be excessive concessions to Russia. These would neither reflect the realities on the battlefield nor the overall balance of power between NATO and Russia. Excessive concessions regarding NATO, which for Moscow would signify the end of American hegemony, could also be globally destabilizing, sending the wrong signal to the "Quartet of Chaos" states in other parts of Eurasia. For now, as Vladimir Putin’s statements late last year indicate, Moscow has responded rather coolly to the idea of a moratorium. However, Donald Trump’s veiled criticism of NATO's open-door policy, expressed in his public remarks on January 7, 2025, could serve as a signal to Moscow of a willingness to engage in dialogue and find common ground.

The issue of the quantity and quality of Ukraine’s defense forces is directly tied to its prospects of joining NATO. If attempts are made to formalize Ukraine’s inability to join NATO in the near future, it will be critical to ensure the quality and scale of its defense forces compensate for the lack of external security guarantees. Achieving this level of capability would be challenging without practical support from partner states. As a result, Washington must firmly remind Russia that it cannot have both—a Ukraine outside of NATO and a Ukraine without defense forces of sufficient quality and quantity. In this context, it is noteworthy that General Keith Kellogg has expressed skepticism about Ukraine’s near-term NATO membership prospects and has emphasized the need for practical reinforcement of Ukraine, should a settlement be reached.

Attempts to pursue a compromise settlement here and now seem unrealistic and would require significant preparation by the U.S. and its partners to alter the Kremlin invaders’ calculus. For now, Russia shows excessive (over)confidence in its ability to achieve its goals without making concessions. In this regard, a crucial point from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s speech last week stands out. A sustainable peace is impossible if Putin can impose his conditions for a settlement, as this would send a dangerous signal to the coalition of countries supporting Russia’s aggression. These points were made to members of the European Parliament, although the primary audience was Donald Trump.

On January 20, 2025, the world will enter an era dominated by U.S. interests defined narrowly rather than broadly. Decisions will be guided by specific U.S. national security and defense interests and economic considerations, rather than by the global system Americans have maintained and built since 1945. This shift will pose additional challenges for Ukraine in articulating why continued U.S. support aligns with American interests.

In this view, studies like "Dollars and Sense: America’s Interest in a Ukrainian Victory" by the American Enterprise Institute are particularly important. The authors provide clear calculations demonstrating why it is cheaper for the U.S. to assist Ukraine now rather than to take additional measures in the event of its collapse. Such precise calculations should form the foundation of Ukraine’s advocacy.

One positive signal is the postponement of a potential political framework for resolving the war by the new administration for 3–6 months. European countries have interpreted this as an implicit acknowledgment that a swift resolution could only occur through Ukraine’s capitulation, which would certainly not align with the interests or vision of the new administration, keen to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors in Afghanistan and to prevent any appearance of weakness.

In any case, we are entering a period of increased uncertainty, which inherently generates both risks and opportunities while complicating forecasts. However, these new circumstances should encourage the development and strengthening of Ukraine’s internal unity regarding the strategic triangle of "goals, resources, and means of achieving goals" in the war. Ukraine’s internal cohesion will provide the best foundation for productive engagement with the new administration in the White House.