On October 14th, President Putin introduced the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with the DPRK to be ratified by the State Duma. The agreement included the clause of mutual military aid in the event of war. The same evening, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi announced that North Korea de facto became a party of the conflict.

A small contingent of North Korea's military has been already deployed to Ukraine – a group of military engineers likely sent to provide technical advice on KN-23 missiles, previously transferred to Russia by DPRK. They also appear to be studying Russian combat experience. On October 3, during the demonstration of assault training in occupied Donetsk, more than 20 North Korean soldiers, including six officers, were killed by a missile strike.

By the end of the year, the DPRK may deploy several thousand troops, according to a Ukrainian intelligence representative anonymously quoted by The Wall Street Journal. As reported by Liga.net, a 3,000-person unit will be part of the 11th Guardian Air Assault Brigade. The unit will likely operate in the Kursk region.

This unit may be one of many. The DPRK's ground forces are estimated to have 1.1 million soldiers, according to Military Balance. The ongoing tensions with South Korea and the internal security needs of the regime put constraints on the number of soldiers that can be deployed in Ukraine. Still, considering the sizable ground forces, North Korea can send at least several thousand soldiers without sacrificing its own security and defense needs. The scale of North Korean support will be contingent upon the utility of reciprocal favors.

Moscow has several bargaining chips. Due to the economic crisis, North Korea can benefit from Russia's generous payments to military personnel. Previously, North Korea used its migrant workers as a source of revenue. Approximately 100,000 North Korean workers were sent abroad, mostly to China and Russia. Now, military personnel may play a similar role.

The deployment in Ukraine would allow the DPRK military to gain combat experience, which could be used to strengthen the ground forces. For a heavily militarized country constantly anticipating a new war with South Korea and the US, the value of such an asset is difficult to overestimate.

The Russian Federation might offer additional technological assistance or supply energy resources to the DPRK. Even food aid for a country that has been teetering on the brink of starvation for years could prove to be very helpful.

Moscow sees North Korean military personnel as a way to make up for the shortage of manpower. Despite offering increasing sign-up bonuses, the Russian military is struggling to attract enough volunteers. A new partial mobilization is a sensitive political issue. Involving the North Korean military could be a solution to this problem, similar to Russia's past efforts to recruit citizens of India, Nepal, Cuba, Syria, and African countries. However, in the case of North Korea, Russia could potentially gain a much larger increase in manpower, possibly with previous military training and without the risk of diplomatic incidents.

The limited external economic relations of North Korea and its nuclear deterrence leave the West few leverages to disincentivize Pyongyang from engaging in direct military conflict. While China has influence over Pyongyang, it has not previously shown willingness to curb the Russian military efforts.

Despite the high potential for further military involvement by the DPRK, there are a few questions that need to be answered. Firstly, will North Korea supplement the manpower with military vehicles and equipment? Given the rapidly decreasing stock of Russian military vehicles, additional supplies for the DPRK forces may worsen the shortage.

Secondly, will North Korean forces undergo additional training? There is a possibility that DPRK soldiers may be deployed without preparation for the dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian war. This could allow Russia to quickly deploy a large number of North Korean personnel at the expense of their combat efficiency. Initial evidence indicates that the first group of DPRK soldiers will indeed receive additional training. However, due to a limited number of instructors and training fields, the training process will likely slow down the deployment. Involving Belarus may only marginally improve the training capabilities. Russia might still try to expedite the deployment by shortening the training program, even though this would have a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the North Korean military.

Thirdly, in what capacity will DPRK soldiers serve on the battlefield? Their potential missions could range from defensive and offensive operations to constructing fortifications or serving as rear guards. They could be deployed in the first or second echelons, on primary or secondary fronts. Given that North Korean units appear to be part of an air assault brigade, and that the Russian military has previously demonstrated assault training to North Korean officers, it is reasonable to anticipate future offensive operations. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of further changes to DPRK's missions.

Finally, how will the DPRK personnel coordinate with the Russian military? As part of the Russian brigade, North Korean soldiers will likely be under Russian command rather than a separate unit. In this case, language and cultural barriers may prevent effective command and control, thus decreasing the combat effectiveness of DPRK personnel.

The issue of the combat effectiveness of North Korean soldiers is crucial. Deploying units with low combat effectiveness, even to protect secondary directions, could pose a threat to the Russian military. In this scenario, the front section under North Korean defense could be vulnerable to attacks from Ukraine. Similarly, these units are unlikely to have much success in assault operations unless their number allows them to oversaturate the Ukrainian defense.

Desertion can become an additional problem. Workers sent abroad by the DPRK often try to escape. North Korean servicemen serving on the demarcation line also take advantage of the opportunity to flee to South Korea. Even though it is yet impossible to assess the potential scale of the problem, Suspilne media reports that 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted from their positions at the Ukrainian border. If desertion gets out of control, it might lead to the withdrawal of the North Korean military.

Despite these problems, the risks should not be underestimated. Limited North Korean involvement, given the basic combat effectiveness of their units, can free up Russian forces to increase the pressure on Ukrainian positions. The large-scale deployment of DPRK soldiers, even with marginal combat effectiveness, might allow Russian and DPRK militaries to oversaturate the Ukrainian defense and advance. The worst-case scenario is a massive involvement of combat-effective North Korean troops, which are capable of coordinating with the Russian military. Under such a scenario, Ukraine will have to mobilize significantly more resources, but the stabilization of the situation might even require the deployment of a Western military contingent to Ukraine.