This article was written in June, and the issues outlined in it were initially discussed with military stakeholders. We are now ready to publish it for a broader audience in order to share our analysis publicly.

In the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian society began recalibrating its strategy for what was evidently becoming the war of attrition. News reports, feedback from soldiers and army officials identified domestic training as one of the weak points that needs to be improved. Civilians drawn into the conscription often underwent insufficient training in the environment that did not motivate them to serve. Our think-tank CВА Initiatives Center responded to the request of the Ukrainian MoD to conduct research into the training problems and to find possible solutions. 

What began as an attempt to evaluate Ukraine’s own training gaps, evolved into a thought-provoking comparative analysis after several respondents were unexpectedly sent to be trained abroad. Using mobile ethnography, we followed the daily reflections of new recruits both in Ukraine and abroad, capturing and comparing their reflections and experiences in real time via 1-1 dialogues on the messaging app in text and voice, which allowed us to grasp a broad range of nuances. For instance, one of the respondents recorded an audio message with a hoarse voice, which he thought was not important, leading us to a whole range of insights regarding recruits’ healthcare situation. Overall this method helped us to develop unexpected hypotheses and further investigate what ally countries may be doing “right” and “wrong” when training their soldiers for the current war. 

NATO allies demonstrated an unprecedented level of support, providing training for the Ukrainian soldiers and officers throughout the years prior and after the full-scale invasion. As a think-tank we often hear how certain aspects of the training experience abroad were integrated by different individuals within the Ukrainian army. Whether it is procedures, organizational structure, management approaches or the attitude toward the subordinates and the communication style. Yet there are also training gaps that may be signaling the larger mismatches worth noticing. 

The respondents of our research went through the training in six European countries during the 2022-2025 and the following analysis only concerns the training that was applied to Ukrainian troops. Our team is not aware of how the actual training for the home troops is being conducted. However, what we found suggests that the gaps may be widespread and critical to the defense capabilities and thereby should be reevaluated based on the experience of the Ukrainian army.

Unlike the range of the problems found in the Ukrainian training centers, such as a lack of training equipment, shortage of professional instructors, poor living conditions, insufficient healthcare and constant disruptions for the air raid alarms, European countries have their own training flaws. Below is a list of some of them that were shared with us by the Ukrainian recruits and officers. 

NATO instructors in the Western European countries still teach soldiers to adhere to the  rules-based warfare and expect the same on behalf of the enemy. Ukraine’s experience shows how dangerous such interpretation can be. 

The enemy routinely violates rules of war. Ukrainian officers overseeing the course abroad found a useful adjustment to this flaw in the training course, telling recruits during the breaks that they need to be ready for the situation where the rules they were just told may not be followed by the adversary. When Western-European instructors talk about the Geneva Convention, they do not make this crucial disclaimer, risking creating false illusions in the minds of the recruits. The result is clearly framed in this example by the Ukrainian company commander: “In [country name] they told us to install the medical tent “as soon as you can”. You know, the white one, with a cross. Our guys laughed. The enemy will attack that tent first!”. Article 37 of the Geneva Convention prohibits perfidy – i.e. soldiers can not pretend to be dead to then shoot an enemy. It will tragically take many lives before the common knowledge of this rule not working on the battlefield becomes ubiquitous in the army, creating critical awareness. The notion that the rules might not be working, and taking it as a default, can bring the extra cautiousness that will save lives. 

FPV and grenade-dropping drones are the primary killers on today’s battlefield, accounting for up to 80% of total human casualties and most of the equipment losses (66% in January). The data from one of the Ukrainian drone divisions shows that the generally used 3-to-1ratio of combat injury to mortality is no longer applicable with drone attacks: it now stands at 0.7-to-1 or 1-to-2. In other words, there are equal chances of getting killed and being wounded when compared with other types of weapons used.  

In Ukraine's most recent Basic Combat Training programme edition, the constant presence of surveillance or combat drones in the air is a basic requirement (that is difficult to implement for all kinds of reasons). The reason is Ukrainian recruits need to build muscle memory for the sound of approaching drones and if someone shouts “air!” everyone has to immediately fall on the ground, pointing their rifles in the sky, searching and aiming at a drone. This is not the case for the training in the NATO countries: lack of drones, lack of operators, limited understanding of its importance, strict regulations. The same company commander told us how in 2022 another western-european instructor ignored the question from one of the recruits: “what about the drones?” by trying to calm everybody down: “don’t worry, drones are high in the sky, they are there for surveillance only”. The Ukrainian troops with combat experience who had to undergo the training after months of active service just nodded along giving each other smiles. 

Drones require changing combat operations. Many NATO vehicles are designed to deflect the threat from the ground – most metal is welded underneath the vehicle to protect against the mines. While now the main threat is coming from air, approaching at a speed of up to 200 km per hour. Drones now destroy the multi-million euro tank almost as easily as a 30,000 euro pick-up truck – now the most common transportation tool of the Ukrainian army. 

Drones completely reshaped the first 15 kilometers of the contact line and this distance will only increase with technological advancement. They now start to change how processes look at even a more operation level — the mother-drone can fly for a depth of 40-50 km, releasing the baby killer drone that can fly additional 10-15 kilometers to reach the target. An optical wire drone is another mainstream weapon now reaching the depth of tenth of kilometers without the need to withstand the obstruction from the signal jammers. 

Outdated programmes of NATO countries have not integrated the lessons learnt in the Russia-Ukraine war yet. Nowadays seeing heavy armoured weapons in the frontline is rare. During the active offensive on April the 30th, 2025, the Russian army lost only 1 tank and 1 IFV. According to Ukrainian instructors we interviewed, tanks are now used mostly as artillery, for indirect fire from camouflaged locations. If exposed, it has a few minutes to hide back before the swarm of drones destroys it. One of the respondents trained in Germany said there they still practiced "tank duels" - something that is hard to imagine happening on the battlefield in 2025. “Is he serious?” - one Ukrainian officer who came for the professional training asked the interpreter.

“Collective weapon” is another important nuance of the new training programme in Ukraine - the variety of weapons used by a single platoon can be a nightmare for logistics. Soldiers need to know not only the other types of weapons used in the team, but also the nuances of using different brands for those types. The pace at which the war changes requires soldiers to be acquainted with different weapons that may be provided by an ally army in critical time to address their specific needs. 

The details in the guidelines in the training programme are out-of-date and instructors know it. Some instructors pick a trainee with recent combat experience in the audience so they can verify if what they are saying is relevant on the battlefield with an eye-contact – they will be nodding in silent approval.

“Today they are showing the process of capturing the enemy. There are too many people in one spot. This won’t work. This is from mission-type warfare from Afghanistan or Iraq. In our case there would be two-three people – max. They don’t train the scenarios for a full-scale war. The war on your land with drones in the air,” – said one of the Ukrainian officers observing the training.  

There is often no time or place for the feedback or adjustments from Ukrainian instructors who oversee the training process. They just gratefully watch what is being taught by foreign colleagues and add crucial remarks during the breaks or in the evenings. On the days off, Ukrainian officers teach recruits what they think is important but has been missed during the main course. For example, electronic warfare and anti-drone tactics. “Luckily, we have a brilliant officer who just came from the battlefield and knows the topic”.

The “ideal soldier” image has changed — now it is an enduring, mentally fit, sharp, outgoing, “normal” civilian who looks exactly like your neighbour and not an action figure or an actor in a combat movie. The ideal soldier can withstand prolonged exposure to stress and uncertainty. The list of military personnel awarded with the highest award of a “Ukraine Hero” contains images of regular civilian men and women who became crucial in defending against the aggressor. 

Some time ago two average-looking men entered the coffee shop I was at and ordered their drinks. I did not even notice them. My friend, an employee of this store, leaned toward me and said: “These guys are legends. They are tough. Really tough.” – he couldn’t find words, hinting at their impressive reputation within the army. 

In an increasingly technological warfare, no longer big muscles are a visual sign of a good soldier. Basic Combat Training course in Ukraine emphasizes mostly back and legs – recent civilians need to be able to carry heavy supplies on long distances. The rest is not as much connected to physical strength. 

In our research of the Basic Combat Training in Ukraine, among many other things, recruits complained about high levels of uncertainty: they found it exhausting not to know enough about the training process, about the day schedule, about the next steps. They live in constant uncertainty: “I am so fed up with not knowing anything. I am so fed up with not knowing where I will be tomorrow at 2 pm,” – said one recruit during his training. 

Our respondents, who were trained abroad, experienced the opposite: they had proper communication, certainty of planning and processes being well-arranged and things being delivered on time. However, Ukrainian officers highlighted the additional risk of being used to too much certainty. They said the current war is a constant uncertainty: not being able to continuously operate in a chaos may play against those newly trained soldiers. Finding normality in uncertainty is among those crucial skills a recruit must have in this context.

Many of the services in the Ukrainian army are provided in-house, by the different departments. While this model often shows poor quality of delivery, it proved its resilience and reliability in this war. Heavy dependence on private contractors in the supply chains of Western armies is a model that is yet to be proven efficient in the current context: being in the defense position on its own territory. Given the learnt inability to act in uncertainty and supply chain potentially crumbling from missile and cyber attacks, the ally armies may be put in a difficult position. As one Ukrainian officer puts it: “The supplier did not bring diesel? - their army will stop. They don’t know how that can be possible. For us – it is not a big deal, it’s a norm.”

Since 2022 Ukrainian private and public companies have actively provided crucial support for the army. These efforts were an extension of the widespread volunteering culture, established as an initial reaction to the start of the war in 2014. For example, the state monopoly “Ukrainian Railways” evacuated 4 million civilians and ensured crucial logistics for the state. At a significant cost, of course: during the first two and a half years since the full-scale invasion began, the company lost 23 employees while on duty. 

Regulatory burden on the military training processes during peacetime is another barrier for effective training. The Army needs to be able to engage all sources available with minimal bureaucratic delays on behalf of the state. Ukrainian instructors highlighted how an overly regulated training environment limits the training effectiveness and may lead to higher levels of casualties on the battlefield. After the Basic combat training course, recruits in Ukraine usually undergo 1-2 more weeks of training at the brigade level near the frontline. There, the safety and other regulations are even looser than in the rear of the country. Combat instructors say those preparations are crucial for recruits’ survival. Ownership of the training ground, ability to use all types of needed equipment, more optimal safety procedures etc. would greatly benefit the army preparedness. This is what the Ukrainian army has, not solely due to the wartime laws. 

Among specific, yet important nuances, Ukrainian recruits complained about the neutral language regarding the enemy. NATO instructors talked about some potential enemy that one day may invade your country. While the audience knew exactly what enemy they will face soon after the course is over – in just a matter of weeks. They say it was confusing to not be able to focus on the certain real enemy, to analyze and rehearse the situations from the current war. Instead they had to listen to the programme designed after the lessons from the Afghanistan/Iraq missions which they felt were often irrelevant or even counterproductive.  

Our research shows both the strengths of the NATO training programmes, while also highlighting limitations and potential risks. This article enlists some of the problems of the basic combat and professional training in the Western European countries. Respondents mentioned the training in the Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) have much more up-to-date training with many of the nuances from above being not relevant. Probably due to the fact that they tailored their training to the specific enemy, posing specified threats, amplified by the specific urgency. 

Now only three countries have first-hand experience in contemporary warfare – Ukraine, Russia and North Korea. The West can properly learn only from Ukraine, thereby more common training programs and professional exchange would be of a great contribution to all parties involved.

For more information on what problems we found when analyzing Basic Combat Training in Ukraine, please read our full report via the link.