A new wave of digital censorship is gathering speed in Russia: one that could drastically reshape the information landscape, especially in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. The Kremlin, which has long restricted access to Western digital platforms, is now pushing for total control: criminalizing basic online activity, sidelining foreign technologies, and mandating a government-run messaging service.

We examine the Kremlin’s latest moves: what goals they serve, and what consequences they may have for the occupied parts of Ukraine.

At the center of this shift is a presidential order issued by Vladimir Putin in May 2025, instructing the government to propose new restrictions on software from so-called “unfriendly states.” Proposals are due by September 1 and are expected to trigger sweeping changes to Russia’s digital infrastructure.

In official Kremlin messaging, this crackdown on foreign software is framed as a response to requests from “Russian business leaders,” following a meeting between Putin and industry representatives.

In a video from that session, Stanislav Iodkovsky, head of Russian tech firm IVA Technologies, raised concerns about foreign IT platforms. Putin’s blunt response — “We need to stifle them” — has now become the unofficial mantra of the Kremlin’s cyber-isolation strategy.

In practice, this means a continued effort to throttle or block global services. YouTube, X (formerly Twitter), and Instagram have all faced state interference. Meta has been declared an “extremist” organization. Even sharing a Facebook link can now land a Russian citizen in court.

Notably, the government still denies responsibility for technical disruptions to platforms like YouTube, blaming instead Google’s alleged failure to upgrade local infrastructure after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But the pattern is unmistakable, and escalating.

That Russia’s restrictions on foreign services have nothing to do with protecting local developers is made clear by the July 22, 2025 law passed by the State Duma: it introduces criminal penalties for simply searching for “extremist materials” online.

The vague wording — “searching for and accessing extremist materials” — effectively criminalizes any interaction with banned content, regardless of intent. The list of what qualifies as “extremist” continues to grow, while enforcement remains opaque and arbitrary.

The timing is deliberate: the law takes effect on September 1, aligning with the Kremlin's broader push to “stifle” foreign digital services.

Even pro-Kremlin figures such as “Safe Internet League” director Ekaterina Mizulina and war propagandist Alexander Sladkov have voiced concern about the new rules.

Russia’s censorship drive goes beyond information access. It now targets the infrastructure of communication itself. WhatsApp, with an estimated 68% penetration rate, appears next in line for removal. State Duma deputy Anton Gorelkin has openly stated that its departure from the Russian market is inevitable.

In June 2025, Putin signed a law creating a new government-controlled messaging platform. This state-owned app, Max, is officially described as a “multifunctional information exchange service.” Evidently, Max is designed to replace WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram—not with better service, but with more surveillance.

Max’s key feature is full integration with Russia’s e-government portal, Gosuslugi, used by over 100 million citizens. In other words, it will become nearly impossible to live an active social or bureaucratic life without it — and any notion of anonymity will be out of the question. (Donbas.Realii has explored in detail how and why Max may even allow authorities to spy on user activity across other apps.)

Max was developed by VK, the Kremlin-aligned tech company that has systematically driven out competitors from the Russian market while creating an alternative, state-curated information space.

Meanwhile, the authorities have not forgotten about VPN services, which have long served as a lifeline for users bypassing state censorship. 

On the same day the Duma passed the law criminalizing extremist searches, it also amended the Criminal Code to treat VPN usage as an “aggravating factor” in the commission of internet-related crimes.

This signals a strategic shift: from reactive censorship to proactive isolation, cutting off access before citizens even attempt to seek it. Nowhere is this more alarming than in the occupied regions of Ukraine, where Russian infrastructure and laws are increasingly dictating daily life.

The monopolization of Russia’s internet is not only political — it’s profitable. The primary beneficiary of recent restrictions is VK, whose controlling shareholder is Gazprom-Media. In 2021, Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of top Putin aide Sergei Kiriyenko, was appointed CEO.

But this story isn’t just about profits or corporate power. It’s about what the Russian internet is being prepared for.

It’s obvious that unregulated messaging apps and VPN services continue to punch holes in the Kremlin’s information firewall, providing access to alternative narratives, including, for example, Radio Liberty’s “Donbas.Realii”, aimed at audiences in the occupied territories. 

So why tighten the grip further this fall? One reason may be a new stage in Russia’s confrontation with the West.

Several scenarios suggest why Moscow is moving now:

Mobilization

The mobilization announced in autumn 2022 was a reputational blow to the Kremlin, although the damage was mitigated by its limited scope. Financial incentives for military volunteers made a comfortable image in shaping the narrative for the internal audience: those who joined the war did so willingly and for money.

But permanent heavy losses on the battlefield, paired with meagre territorial gains, have steadily depleted the Russian army’s human resources. The flow of volunteers, many of whom were driven by poverty, desperation or ideology, began to decline by late 2023 and into 2024. Even as signing bonuses grew, Russian media started reporting a drop in enlistment. Meanwhile, the average age of contract soldiers continues to rise, and Western sources estimate that Russian losses in 2025 will surpass last year’s figures.

Should another wave of mobilization be needed, the Kremlin will likely move preemptively to stifle public dissent and prevent any coordination of protest, by severing communication channels.

Shortly after the new internet restrictions were passed, a bill was introduced to the Duma proposing year-round military conscription, from January 1 to December 31.

A New War

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, the information space was not fully sanitized. Laws punishing “discrediting the army” didn’t exist, and YouTube remained freely available.

This suggests the Kremlin anticipated a quick victory: one that wouldn’t require information lockdowns to hide its failures. If the Kremlin is now preparing to widen the conflict and has learned from its mistakes, it will act preemptively.

Though a direct war with NATO may seem far-fetched to outsiders, inside Russia it is taken seriously. Parliament members, officials, advisors, and pro-Kremlin analysts routinely speak of it. Russian news channels produce daily forecasts of an impending NATO war.

Russian media churn out daily predictions of a looming conflict with NATO

In Europe, talk increasingly focuses not on if such a war will come but when.

In the event of open hostilities, say in the Baltics, Moscow would seek not just to insulate its population from outside information, but to eliminate dependence on Western digital systems entirely. That means replacing foreign software, restructuring finance and data infrastructure, and preventing leaks from within.

The End of the “Economic Miracle”

From 2022 to 2024, Russia’s economic resilience was branded a “miracle.” Predictions of a crash never came to pass. Sanctions were patchy. Oil and gas kept flowing. The state pumped money into the military sector and handed out generous payments to war participants. All this created the illusion that war was paying off for Russia.

But the mood is changing. At the 2025 St. Petersburg Economic Forum, senior officials finally admitted the economy was cooling with expectations of stagnation. The banking sector is weighed down by bad loans. Sberbank flagged weak demand for business credit.

In late July, the Central Bank conceded that only the military-industrial complex was still growing, euphemistically describing this as “state-driven industrial investment.”

Here, Donbas.Realii explores how potential U.S. sanctions on Russian oil buyers could further destabilize this fragile outlook.

These are just the visible signs of a broader unraveling. Even Kremlin-friendly experts are no longer optimistic.

This contradicts the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that ordinary Russians are thriving thanks to the war. But mounting costs — higher taxes, utility hikes, frozen savings, slashed social spending — could easily fuel unrest. Moscow will now try to suppress that unrest and blur the connection between its foreign policy and economic decline.

Each new Kremlin measure deepens the isolation of residents in Russian-occupied Ukraine from the rest of the country.

This isn’t new. Since 2015, Ukrainian cellular networks, radio, and television have been blocked in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. The result: greater physical and psychological separation from the rest of Ukraine.

When yet another messaging app stops working, and even looking up information about the outside world becomes dangerous, the isolation of people under occupation will only grow.

Source: Donbas Realii, Radio Liberty

Author: Oleksandr Demchenko – journalist at Donbas Realii, military serviceman, and consultant to the Come Back Alive Initiatives Center.