The BRICS summit began in Kazan on October 22, 2024, under Russia's chairmanship, with official events starting on October 23. Nearly all heads of BRICS member states attended in person, except for Brazil's president, who joined via video link due to an injury.

BRICS currently includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, the UAE, and Iran.

Leaders from countries aligned with Russia, who are seeking to join BRICS but have not yet been admitted, also attended the summit. Notably, representatives from Syria, Belarus, the Palestinian Authority, and the Taliban were present. This marks turned out to be the largest gathering of world leaders in Russia since the start of its full-scale invasion to Ukraine.

Denial of Isolation

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears keen to attract new members to the BRICS, particularly those loyal to the Kremlin or dependent on Russia in energy, economic, or military spheres. This effort is aimed at signaling to the U.S. and its allies that Russia is far from isolated and can still expand its partnerships. Within BRICS, Moscow seeks to demonstrate its proactive position to pursue in building a multi-vector foreign policy. The involvement of states and regimes associated with Russia, especially Syria, appears as an effort to strengthen Russia’s influence within the group.

Turkey’s potential participation in BRICS could become a key factor in its expansion, although no immediate developments are expected. Turkey’s interest in joining may serve as a means to exert pressure on its Western partners, NATO, and other BRICS members, who could benefit from Ankara’s involvement. But during the summit, Putin had a private meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Putin also met with the presidents of Palestine, Serbia, Laos, Mauritania, and Bolivia, as well as with the UN Secretary-General and the Prime Minister of Vietnam.

It is important to note that not all BRICS members are in direct opposition to Western policies. Turkey, for instance, while critical of some Western actions, remains a NATO member and maintains strong economic ties with Europe, including active cooperation with Ukraine in defense and arms trade. Ankara shows no signs of ending these relations. Likewise, other BRICS members do not necessarily adopt a confrontational stance. The exception is Iran, which seems most eager to aggravate geopolitical tensions, especially with nations backing Israel.

Back in 2020, the U.S. officially named China as the main threat. However, China has avoided severing its existing ties and prefers not to engage in direct confrontation. The UAE is also unlikely to support positioning BRICS as an oppositional bloc, instead viewing it as a platform to defend its interests in the global hydrocarbon market.

Russia hosted 36 state delegations and representatives from six international organizations at the Kazan BRICS summit. The Kremlin may frame this turnout as a victory against Russia’s isolation and his regime. However, the central question remains: what motivated the majority of participants to attend the summit in Kazan? Did they come to Putin—or through him?

The Attraction to China

This year, Russia chaired BRICS and hosted a summit. Despite this, it is clearly not the main economic power within the group. From an economic perspective, the most attractive members for the "poorer" participants are China and India. One of Putin’s key goals for this summit, according to The Economist, is to build a new global financial and payment system, the BRICS Bridge, aimed at "striking the dominance of the US in world finance" and "protecting Russia and its friends from sanctions." This system would allow participating countries to conduct cross-border transactions through digital platforms controlled by their central banks. Russia’s motivations here are driven largely by economic challenges and sanctions pressure.

From an investment perspective, Russia is openly waiting for the attraction of funds for mineral extraction, Far East development, and other projects. Reorienting toward BRICS markets is called the only viable way to sustain its economy amid rising war costs.

China, in its turn, is actively pursuing investment opportunities that will enhance the flow of natural resources into its domestic market and expand its global reach. A prime example of this is China’s economic expansion into Africa, where it builds infrastructure and communication networks, often taking control of existing assets through debt traps.

However, not all BRICS members share Russia’s desire to reduce reliance on the dollar or exit the dollar-based system. For example, India has rejected attempts to promote the Chinese yuan as an alternative reserve currency. As the second-largest economy in BRICS, India also has a complicated relationship with China. The two countries, which remain the primary buyers of Russian oil after the G7 price cap, have ongoing economic and territorial disputes, including border skirmishes. It seems unlikely that Moscow will be able to reconcile India and China in the near future, especially as Russia’s dependence on China grows—a fact that other BRICS members and candidates, including India, may find hard to ignore.

There are also divisions between Arab countries and Iran. The Gulf States and Iran differ in their views on the Middle East and their stance on Israel. Neither Iran nor the UAE would welcome dominance by the other within any multilateral structure, as seen in OPEC, where both countries are members. The Gulf States remain wary of Iranian proxy attacks on their oil infrastructure. Just days before the Kazan summit, the UAE and Iran revisited their dispute over islands in the Persian Gulf.

As a result, the partners Putin has gathered for BRICS do not always share the same positions, and many fear ending up in a weakened minority within the group.

Expansion

Recently, several countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, including Malaysia, Venezuela, Thailand, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and some others. In September, Turkey formally applied to join the group, likely as a strategy to balance its position among geopolitical blocs and apply pressure on Western nations. Previously, Turkey has shown dissatisfaction with the lack of progress toward EU membership, having been a candidate since 1999.

At the same time, NATO has stated that Turkey's participation in BRICS is a normal development and will not impact Ankara's significant role within the North Atlantic Alliance.

However, India is cautious about admitting new members. It supports the creation of a category for "partner countries" that would not have voting rights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi doesn’t want BRICS to evolve into an anti-American bloc dominated by China and Russia, a sentiment echoed by Indian officials in Western media.

Brazil and South Africa share this view. South African officials have also stated that they will resist attempts to dilute their influence by inviting Nigeria or Morocco to join the alliance. The two nations had long-standing diplomatic tensions over differing views on Western Sahara, and South Africa competes with Nigeria for regional leadership. 

While Russia tries to strengthen its voice within BRICS by including its satellites or close partners, this strategy may face limitations. With no substantial opposition to the main players, Russia may focus its efforts on economic and energy projects, steering clear of the broader challenges posed by global confrontation.