China and Brazil held an international meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss their proposals for a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine. 

The Chinese representatives announced their intention to create a "Friends for Peace" platform aimed at contributing to the "resolution of the Ukrainian crisis"—a term deliberately and falsely used by China to describe the Russia-Ukraine war.

In reality, this initiative aims to create an alternative to Ukraine's peace formula. Although the China-Brazil initiative is presented as an open platform for inclusive dialogue, it is increasingly evident that it is positioned in contrast to the Ukrainian peace plan. Supporting this notion is a statement from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claims that the "China-Brazil plan received positive feedback from representatives of 110 countries."

According to the spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the plan represents the unification of "more balanced, objective, and rational voices to create the conditions for a ceasefire." By this logic, Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty and demand for justice against aggressors is portrayed as non-objective and irrational.

It is important to note the difference in language between the China-Brazil plan and Ukraine’s Global Peace Summit. While 90 countries officially signed (签署)  the Global Peace Summit’s joint communiqué, the China-Brazil plan is described with a more vague wording of “favorable response” (积极回应). This vague phrasing likely refers to verbal support rather than formal endorsements. Furthermore, there is no publicly available list of countries, documents, or detailed records of these discussions. 

One might question whether these "positive responses" were simply the result of broader bilateral discussions where the war in Ukraine was mentioned alongside other issues, such as Chinese investment. Given the absence of similar acknowledgments from the diplomatic institutions of most of these 110 countries—except for South Africa—it is plausible that China’s interpretation of "positive feedback" is somewhat exaggerated. Even the Swiss involvement, widely reported in media as support for the China-Brazil initiative, turns out to be a case of general interest rather than concrete participation, as Switzerland simply expressed support for principles like a ceasefire and political settlement without signing any document.

But why the specific number of 110 countries? The United Nations recognizes 193 member states and 2 observer countries. The Global Peace Summit's communiqué, signed on June 16, 2024, by 80 countries, initially lost three signatories, with new ones gradually joining. By June 28, 2024, Micronesia became the 85th signatory. If you subtract the 85 signatories from the total number of recognized countries, you arrive at exactly 110—the number that China claims gave "positive feedback." This raises the suspicion that China simply counted all countries that did not sign the Global Peace Summit communiqué as supporters of its own plan.

Ukraine, for its part, spent over six months gathering 90 signatures for the Global Peace Summit. How China managed to organize support from 110 countries in just a few months, even informally, remains unclear, particularly given that this so-called support appears to have been discussed primarily during bilateral meetings.

Beyond this numerical coincidence, there are further concerns about the political positioning of the China-Brazil plan in opposition to Ukraine’s peace initiative. Visual evidence also raises questions. One image shows the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, where 90 countries officially signed the communiqué. Another image shows the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ announcement of a meeting with Brazilian officials on July 29, which contains the first mention of the "positive feedback" from “more than 110 countries.” However, there is no list of these countries, no documents, and no concrete evidence. The third image shows the "Friends of Peace" meeting on September 29, during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, where only 17 of the 20 invited countries attended, and just 13 signed the joint communiqué.

So, is the support for the China-Brazil plan truly as global as China claims?

It is also worth noting China's efforts to contrast the narratives of the "failed" Peace Summit with the image of a "successful" meeting of the "Friends for Peace." Chinese media widely circulated a photo of a disappointed Volodymyr Zelenskyi, presenting it as evidence of the summit's failure. In contrast, images of a smiling Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi were used to illustrate the success of China's visually similar summit, which Chinese media heavily promoted:

However, beyond the question of the number of signatories, a more critical issue arises: can the six points proposed by China, following the visit of its special representative for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Li Hui, to Global South countries, be considered a genuine peace plan or initiative in the full sense?

China's proposal includes the following steps:

• The "three principles of cooling down the situation": halting military actions, preventing escalation, and avoiding the spread of the conflict to new territories. The principle of avoiding escalation, however, creates preconditions for Russia to intensify attacks on Ukrainian territory. Russia would interpret this principle as a restriction on Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian territory in response.
• Dialogue and negotiations as the only path to resolving the conflict: Negotiating with Russia has shown that wording matters—mislabeling the war as a "crisis" sets a dangerous precedent. If incorrect wording, such as “crisis” instead of “war” is used from the very beginning, the process has the potential to turn into an analog of the negotiation tracks in which Ukraine was involved  in the previous phase of the war from 2014 to 2022. Ukraine has never refused to negotiate on essential matters, such as the exchange of prisoners of war, returning the bodies of the deceased, or the release of unlawfully detained Ukrainian citizens. Ukraine's efforts on the humanitarian track cannot be ignored: it was the Ukrainian side that consistently initiated these negotiations and has consistently led these humanitarian efforts.
• Avoiding attacks on civilians and civilian objects, protecting women and children, and respecting prisoners of war's rights: This should primarily be addressed to Russia, whose forces have executed prisoners of war and targeted Ukrainian journalists during their illegal detentions and transfers from one prison to another.
• Opposition to the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons: Russia's actions, including the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and constant threats to the Rivne NPP, as well as Russia's manipulations around Ukraine's alleged attempts to “organize nuclear terrorism against the Russian Federation," nuclear intimidation of the West and Ukraine exemplify nuclear terrorism. The next point—opposing attacks on nuclear facilities—further highlights Russia's success in embedding its narrative in this initiative.

The fact that questions such as "Who owns the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?" are raised at China's largest forum reflects the biased narrative in China’s information space.

Chinese authorities promote a ceasefire without the return of Ukraine’s territories, implying that the Russian-occupied ZNPP is a part of Russia. Chinese media retransmit messages from Russian sources, claiming Ukraine is endangering global security by attacking the ZNPP. An August 12 article, said to be generated by AI, which means that algorithms analyzed a number of sources in Chinese to generate this article, even titled its analysis: " Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Heavily Damaged by Ukrainian Troops: Global Energy Market in Crisis." Whether author’s manipulation or AI analysis, this represents the information field in which 1.1 billion Chinese internet users operate. Similar narratives are reinforced by Chinese national television, reaching 99.79% of the population.

In this context, where Ukrainian forces are consistently portrayed as attacking the ZNPP, the fifth point of the China-Brazil plan — "Opposing attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities" —should be perceived only as  blaming Ukraine for "dangerous" and “wrong” actions.

The subtle language in the fifth point reflects its ideological bias. The phrase "反对攻击核电站等和平核设施" translates as "Opposing attacks on nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities." The repeated use of the term "nuclear" prevents broader interpretations of civilian infrastructure: without the single character in the center of the phrase “和平核设施”, it changes the meaning from “peaceful nuclear facilities” to “civilian infrastructure”. This would otherwise expose Russia’s widespread destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure - a fact that is widely known in China. However, such deliberate phrasing avoids assigning blame to Russia, instead shifting responsibility to Ukraine for attempting to reclaim its territory.

Similarly, the fourth point—"Opposing the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons"—feeds into the Chinese information narrative, which has accused Ukraine, through Russian fabrications, of housing "American biolabs in Ukraine." Chinese state media, such as Xinhua, have repeated these false claims, further aligning with Russian disinformation.

The plan should also be analyzed through the lens of possible personal biases of its active communicators and promoters. For instance, detailed discussions in Brazil are being led by China's special envoy, Li Hui. This is the same diplomat who, in 2019, received an award from Vladimir Putin and, in 2020, wrote an essay stating that Beijing and Moscow would "stand shoulder to shoulder and strengthen cooperation, the international order will be unwavering, and global principles—undeniable." He also noted that both sides "would firmly support each other's efforts to protect their sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and other core interests." Given this context, it is impossible to claim even nominal neutrality regarding Ukraine, which was already in an armed conflict with Russia at that time.

By the way, the aforementioned publication from the Chinese Foreign Ministry shows subtle differences in terminology: the war is referred to three times as the "Ukrainian crisis," twice simply as a "crisis," and once as "Russian-Ukrainian military actions/matter." Is it possible that in their verbal discussions with other countries, the Chinese side was more candid about Russia's involvement and responsibility, referring to the "Ukrainian crisis" as the Russian-Ukrainian war? Perhaps this helped gain initial approval, allowing China to communicate about the war unilaterally as the "Ukrainian crisis"?

There is also a section emphasizing joint support for international cooperation in energy, finance, grain trade, transportation, and more, as well as safeguarding critical infrastructure, such as oil and gas pipelines, energy facilities, and undersea optical cables, to ensure the stability of global supply systems. This essentially reflects one of China's primary wishes regarding the Russia-Ukraine war—de-escalation for the sake of globalization. However, achieving real de-escalation requires additional pressure on the side that continues to escalate the situation, namely, Russia.

Yet again, the final sixth point begins with a West-blaming call: "We oppose the fragmentation of the world and the creation of closed political or economic blocs." This statement resonates with many countries of the Global South, as at least part of these players are convinced that this war is just another tool of the "bad West" to redivide the world into spheres of influence again. The phrase "We call for strengthening international cooperation on issues of energy, currency, finance, trade, food security, and protecting critical infrastructure, such as oil and gas pipelines..." carries a direct plea not to interfere with trade with Russia. At the same time, since the war started, oil—which China and India continue to buy despite difficulties—remains the primary "fuel" igniting this war. In China’s peace formula, this "fuel" is cynically referred to as Western weapons, which allow Ukraine to survive. A "pleasant" bonus is also the absence of any call to stop selling stolen grain from the occupied territories of Ukraine in the "food security" points.

• One way or another, the added value of any peace initiative is primarily measured by two factors: first, the clarity of the steps outlined to achieve the initiative’s stated goals, and second, the mechanisms established to address violations of the conditions specified in the document. Whether an initiative can truly be considered a peace plan depends on its fulfillment of these criteria. From this perspective, the China-Brazil initiative cannot be classified as a comprehensive peace plan, as it lacks both detailed practical steps toward the stated goals and mechanisms for addressing violations of its principles. While China has the potential to exert significant influence over the Russian Federation, the initiative fails to propose any tangible measures to apply such leverage.
• This again proves the fact that peace plans cannot be imposed on Ukraine by external actors. The basis for resolving the conflict must be built on Ukraine’s own vision of its security needs. In terms of detailing the necessary steps and providing response mechanisms, President Zelenskyi’s Victory Plan comes much closer to being considered a legitimate peace plan, as it includes a description of tools aimed at achieving the stated objectives. However, even this plan leaves unanswered questions about how violations of the agreed-upon conditions would be addressed or what mechanisms would be employed in response.
• The first point of the Victory Plan, which mentions an invitation to NATO as inevitable, does not take into account the main risk: an invitation does not automatically result in membership in the alliance. There could be a significant gap between the invitation and formal membership, during which NATO's security guarantees would not apply to Ukraine’s territory.  It also remains unclear which territories would be covered by such guarantees. And if Ukraine is supposed to receive an invitation to NATO, it is unlikely this would align with any Ukrainian military operations in Russia’s Kursk region (as referenced in the second point of the plan), since one of NATO members' greatest concerns is being drawn into a direct military confrontation with Russia.
• Nonetheless, other aspects of the Victory Plan—such as non-nuclear deterrence, strategic economic potential, joint protection of Ukraine's natural resources and mineral deposits with international partners, and especially  the post-war presence of Ukrainian military contingents in Europe—clearly demonstrate that Ukraine aspires not only to be a beneficiary of security provided by its partners but also to contribute to the collective security framework. From this angle, the plan holds promise, as it addresses the interests of both Ukraine and the countries that have supported it throughout the conflict.
• Of course, Ukraine cannot prevent external actors from continuing to propose their own peace initiatives or plans as alternatives. However, Ukraine must firmly assert that its own vision is decisive in shaping the conditions for any future resolution, especially regarding security guarantees. If external players are genuinely sincere in their pursuit of peace, they will base their efforts on Ukraine’s perspective and engage in honest dialogue to find common ground between their views and Ukraine's.

Therefore, any illusions about the China-Brazil plan or its discussions must be dispelled. It is essential to fully comprehend the risks and biases of these so-called “neutral” sides and their (non)signatories. These risks must be actively communicated to Ukraine's Western partners, as there is a substantial contingent in both Europe and the United States that may believe, or wish to believe, in the neutrality of such positions and could be inclined to promote this plan.