After more than a month of intense diplomatic wrangling between Kyiv, Moscow, Europe and the US, the contours of an acceptable deal to end the Russia-Ukraine war are starting to appear.

After Donald Trump’s original 28-point plan favouring Russia was leaked to Axios, Ukrainian authorities supported by major European powers did their best to turn the document into something more acceptable without incurring the wrath of the US government for being unconstructive.  

Three major points of contention between Ukraine and Russia became clear: security for Ukraine, Ukrainian sovereignty, and territory.

The Kremlin repeatedly referred to the need “to remove root causes of conflict”, essentially meaning Ukraine should surrender territories Russia has claimed but cannot conquer, despite a staggering bill in blood. This particularly concerned the northwestern Donetsk region around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Similarly, the Kremlin consistently demanded severe constraints on future Ukrainian defence capabilities and troop numbers along with readiness to eschew a Nato membership once and for all. These demands would have made Ukraine defenceless and set for economic degradation (as no one is going to invest in such a state) while limiting Ukrainian sovereignty. No wonder such Russian demands proved unacceptable for the Ukrainian leadership and society.

After a month of negotiations, Ukraine has made progress on the security and sovereignty dimensions – with the territorial issue being subordinate to these concerns.

Ukraine has been consistently against severe limits on peacetime troop numbers, since these act as deterrence vis-a-vis Russia. While a vision for an 800,000-strong army has been reported, this should be treated rather as a hypothetical upper limit of possibility – and more thorough calculation will follow in terms of affordability and sustainability. But the war has made clear the need for trained reserves, which could quickly scale up the number of troops if required.

Likewise, nobody in Ukraine expects Western partners to be ready to fight for us in case of a new round of hostilities.

Specific Western commitments of weaponry and ammo, intelligence data and training might be a step forward compared with vague security deals signed in 2024 between Ukraine and Nato countries. While such commitments don’t equate to Article 5 of the Nato treaty enshrining collective defence, ratification of them by partner countries’ parliaments (or Congress, in the US case) would be a credible alternative.

Tangible written commitments are important for Ukraine, which was traumatised by the failed Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

It also seems that the “coalition of willing” headed by the UK and France is ready to deploy a kind of Reassurance Force for naval policing, air defence over western and central Ukraine, and training and advisory.

This has meant Volodymyr Zelensky is now able to raise the possibility of trading such terms for forswearing Nato membership as demanded by Russia. However, the Zelensky later said Ukraine’s constitution, which since 2019 contains provision regarding the goal to eventually join Nato, would not be changed.

Above all, Ukraine wants clear security commitments without major constraints on its sovereignty.

Territory continues to be the most contentious issue as Russia unequivocally demands that Ukraine unilaterally surrender northwestern Donetsk.

The Trump administration’s ideas of a demilitarised special economic zone look like an attempt to bridge Ukrainian and Russian positions, but leaves security issues unaddressed, which is a problem for Ukraine.

Zelensky made clear that latitude for concessions there depends on the substance of the security package, and that such concessions could only be agreed by national referendum as the constitution prescribes. The baseline Ukrainian position is that the current front line shall form a basis for any territorial agreement.

The elephant in the room is how Vladimir Putin is going to respond to this unified Ukrainian, European and US position. Thus far, he has proved to be a skilful manipulator, turning negotiations in Russia’s favour even when seeming cornered.

Recent statements from Putin and his top foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov do not give grounds for optimism on real progress towards a settlement. Putin seems to believe time is on his side as Russian forces hold the initiative on the battlefield through bloody infiltration tactics and battlefield interdiction using UAVs and glide bombs.

Putin’s stance is based on a combination of costly slow advances, disported battlefield reports (recent reports of the capture of the city of Kupyansk in Kharkiv proved premature) and an assessment of Western actions along with Ukrainian problems.

The Trump administration 2.0 has arranged diplomacy in such a way that Putin doesn’t fear negative consequences for lack of progress – there is no proper combination of carrot and stick applied by the US towards Russia right now.

Europe managed to agree only at the 11th hour a necessary package of financial assistance for Ukraine in 2026-27 and in such a way as to not touch Russian frozen assets. Ukraine’s defence forces are still facing crises of infantry quality and quantity along with command-and-control problems.

From Putin’s perspective, the best alternative to any agreement is to keep fighting. Despite mounting economic problems, he is sticking to maximalist political demands, entertaining hope of ultimate triumph.

Ukraine, with the aid of European partners, has demonstrated a unique diplomatic skill of defending its national interests while navigating between Moscow and Washington in such a way as not to be treated as the spoiler of the Trump peace process with negative consequences for Ukraine-US ties.

The fact that even such diplomacy might not be able to deliver a durable peace deal in short order is a sombre lesson for Trump that only diplomacy combining positive and negative inducements has a chance for real success.

Originally published by iPaper