Mykola Bielieskov, Research Fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, told us that the Ukraine war equation has shifted slightly — the U.S. has gone from backer to mediator — but the fundamental problem persists, as Europe remains stuck in crisis management and Putin sees no reason to stop.

I recently revisited your June 2024 appearance on a geopolitics podcast, where you argued that the West had drifted into crisis-management rather than pursuing a coherent strategy to defeat Russia, and you highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. presidential elections. Now, a year on, how do you assess the situation? Where do we stand compared with last summer?

In some ways, things remain the same if you look at battlefield dynamics and the challenges for both sides. It’s still a war of attrition and exhaustion — with all its risks and problems at different levels of war. Tactically and operationally, it still resembles World War I: slow movement of the front line in Russia’s favor — yes, we need to admit it — but very slow and very costly. Strategically, it’s still a war of attrition about internal cohesion, the cohesion of your coalition and partners, about resources and morale.

Since you mentioned crisis management: Europe — now predominantly responsible for aiding Ukraine and mobilizing more resources — still doesn’t have a long-term vision of victory with adequate resources. It’s about continuing approaches devised in 2020–2023, with one major change: the U.S. is more a mediator than an active backer.

Concerns about a reassessment of the U.S. role in the Russia–Ukraine war proved valid — luckily not as radical as feared in terms of a full disengagement. We see that Trump wants to end the conflict as quickly as possible, based on compromise, but he’s fine with Europeans providing support to Ukraine through their own funding via a new mechanism created this summer.

It’s not the U.S. of the Biden administration, when aid came through supplemental funding approved by Congress. The concerns proved valid, but not as dangerously so as people feared — especially after the very tumultuous meeting at the end of February this year between the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents.

One difference from last summer is Russia’s economic stance; there are more evident signs of crisis. What’s your sense of how long Russia can continue this aggression? They’ve ramped up air attacks. Can they sustain it?

That’s a question even economic experts can’t answer. We’ll see problems; we’ll see the Russian economy cooling down — the kind of Keynesian boost from additional military spending isn’t producing the results it did in 2023–2024. We see how Russia tries to curb inflation while sustaining the war effort, the pressure on the Russian central bank, and criticism of it. I’m not an expert on Russia’s economy, and even true experts don’t have a clear answer.

The problem is that Putin thinks in terms of geopolitics, not economics. Economic concerns were secondary for him in 2014–15, in 2022, and are unfortunately now.

That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t continue with sanctions and pressure to limit Russian revenues, but banking on Putin’s rationality through the lens of economics is, in my understanding, futile. Until he can no longer sustain the war, he will try to sustain it — because for him, geopolitics, imperial grandeur, and grievances are primary; economics is secondary.

What has changed for Putin since the inauguration of Donald Trump? Has he been emboldened by his experience with the new American administration?

I’m certain Putin isn’t receiving signals that would make him reassess his calculations and plans. He’s stubborn and confident, and he keeps repeating the maximalist demands introduced about a year ago in June. I think Trump reads Putin the wrong way.

First, Trump thinks economic incentives — joint projects, ventures, future investment — would be enough to persuade Putin to stop aggression. That’s mirror-imaging from a former real estate businessman who prioritizes the economy. Putin doesn’t.

Also, Trump and part of his team read the war’s dynamics as both sides exhausting at the same pace, thus mutually open for compromise — hoping that with more fighting, Russia would be more open to compromise. Add to this the tumultuous 200+ days of difficult Ukraine–U.S. exchanges and the strain on the transatlantic link.

Putin interprets these signals as proof he can outwait the West. When his army advances, however slowly and despite the cost, and he’s able to create new realities on the ground, what’s the rationale for him to stop? There’s no set of incentives or costs forcing him to reassess.

How might Putin have interpreted the US-Russia summit?

He likely interpreted the summit in Alaska very differently from Trump. For Trump, it was an attempt at high-level diplomacy — personal charisma and persuasion — to move Putin toward negotiations. For Putin, it was approval for everything he has done: after 3.5 years of attrition and destruction inflicted on Ukraine, he’s welcomed and engaged; there is dialogue.

That’s the problem: how Putin sees the world and how Trump sees it are very different, with no intersection. The signals Trump sends as inducements are, unfortunately, interpreted by Putin as weakness and as an incentive to continue fighting. That’s my major problem with Trump’s diplomacy.

Compared to last year, what developments do you see in the CRINK alliance: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — and now maybe even India?

It’s still a loose grouping of countries; I wouldn’t use the word “alliance,” which implies readiness to fight on one another’s behalf. We’ve seen cracks — after U.S. and Israeli attacks, Iran was on the back foot; Russia wasn’t present. I’d call it a grouping loosely aligned by anti-American sentiment.

The Iranian part has weakened: they lost Syria; they were attacked by Israel and the U.S.; despite aggressive rhetoric, they’re on the back foot. Russia has become more self-sufficient with UAVs.

North Korea has proven a very consistent ally: we’ve seen North Koreans fighting on Russia’s behalf in the Kursk region, and it’s been consistently shipping hardware — missiles, artillery pieces, munitions. Contacts have intensified.

China is still Russia’s strategic rear, pretending neutrality while being quite pro-Russian — with about 80% of components and materials needed to sustain Russia’s war effort coming from China. Nominally, China pretends it isn’t as active as North Korea and may be fine with North Korea as a kind of front aid while China stays on the sidelines; trade remains very valuable for Russia.

India was earlier trying to balance— to be neither pro-Western nor pro-Chinese/pro-Russian — but Trump disrupted this balance, forcing India to demonstrate freedom of maneuver and that it isn’t dependent on the U.S., showing it has others to talk with.

So, aside from Iran being weakened and North Korea introducing its soldiers into the Russian Federation, things are quite the same: Russia sustains a loose grouping that supports its war effort, while they have zero of their own coalition supporting them. Wars of attrition are wars of coalitions; having external backing allows them to at least sustain the fighting.

The 65 military personnel from Indian at the Zapad-2025 exercise — was that just signaling? Did it even register in Kyiv that India participated in Zapad? They also took part in Zapad 2021, with an even larger contingent of 200.

It certainly wasn’t the main story. The most reported detail was the presence of two U.S. observers in these exercises, not the India's observers and officers.

What to make of the U.S. presence?

It might be interpreted as a confidence-building measure, but it’s hardly enough. Two officers in Belarus aren’t enough; confidence building is about mutual restraint, and we don’t see that.

As for the India's military personnel, it’s natural they’re eager to learn how Russia adapted its forces based on recent battlefield lessons. Given bilateral relations, that’s natural and doesn’t radically change India’s posture toward the Russia–Ukraine war.

It’s been a bumpy half-year for U.S.–Ukraine relations. We have heard Zelenskyy in recent weeks become more overtly critical of the futility of Trump’s peace attempts. Is it a sign that bilateral relations are on a more solid ground after a while?

With Trump, you’re never on solid ground: every day is new; nothing is fixed; everything is possible. Previous commitments and pledges may not be as solid as they appeared yesterday.

Ukraine, as a U.S. partner, and allies around the world are trying to find a formula to deal with Trump. The fact that others find it difficult shows it’s not about Ukraine; it’s about Trump’s uniqueness and his very diverse team producing different signals.

We have learned it’s risky and dangerous to engage in public disputes, so we try to sway Trump behind closed doors, relying on our European partners. We need to credit a number of European leaders, including the NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, for being involved on Ukraine’s side. It’s ironic: in 2015–2021, it was only Ukraine trying to define red lines beyond which it wasn’t ready to move in any settlement with Russia; now we have Germany and France on our side — once mediators, now engaged in a joint effort.

The U.S. has repositioned. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. was an active proponent and backer, providing direct aid through funding approved by Congress. Now, Trump positions the U.S. more as a mediator, an indirect enabler of Ukraine. Kyiv doesn’t like it — it undermines our negotiating position and sends the opposite signal to Putin — but the U.S. is a democracy; voters made a choice last November. All we can do is adjust as much as possible.

The fact that we found a formula to get U.S. weaponry through European funding is something — back in March and April it was an open question whether the U.S. would continue providing equipment. Now we have a mechanism. But it’s obvious Trump has shifted responsibility for supporting Ukraine onto Europeans and will stick with it. There’s likely nothing we can do to return to the Biden-era mechanisms. Every strategy has its limits.

Has Europe found its agency after America distancing from Ukraine war? There’s talk about a “coalition of the willing,” etc. Do you see a real change of strategy, or just new diplomatic props?

“Europe” is too broad of a concept. Different countries respond differently; each is trying to find its niche. We see attempts by a number of countries — plus the NATO Secretary-General — to find mechanisms to aid Ukraine here and now. Along with the Secretary-General and the Scandinavian states, we see Germany, the Netherlands, and the Baltic states pledging aid and money within this pool scheme. That’s one part of the equation.

We also see a coalition of the willing, with the UK and France as major architects. From the start, they were consistent: they’d come not before the end of hostilities, but afterward; they wouldn’t be deployed at Ground Zero to ensure Russia doesn’t violate any settlement or line of control.

They’ve been straightforward that the coalition of the willing would play a support function, not a predominant role in any settlement as guarantors. We shouldn’t have illusions. Maybe some overestimated what the UK, France, and others are ready to do, but from the beginning they have been clear about it.

In general, Europe remains risk-averse — focused on preserving freedom of movement and avoiding major risks of confrontation with Russia, trying to limit confrontation to Ukrainian territory. Nothing has changed there.

My reading is that the plan among the NATO Secretary-General and European leaders is to ensure a smooth landing in new realities: the U.S. won’t be the major backer of Euro-Atlantic security; at best, it will be a backer of last resort, not the first resort as in the Cold War and after. For this, Europe needs both to support Ukraine and not disrupt relations with the U.S. — it's a tricky and difficult diplomatic balancing act.

Luckily, Trump isn’t framing it as “you’re either with me or supporting Ukraine,” so Europeans have some freedom to support Ukraine because they understand the risks if Ukraine fails, while not displeasing Trump publicly. Those are the overarching ideas we’ve seen from European leaders during these 200+ days of the second Trump administration.

After the recent Russian drone horde invading Poland, would you say Europe has succeeded in containing the war within the Ukrainian and Russian borders? What do you make of this drone incursion into Poland, what developments might follow?

This episode shows attempts to confine the conflict to Ukrainian territory are failing. War has a tendency to spread — either unintentionally or, probably given the evidence, intentionally. What I’m sure of is that NATO isn’t adjusting its air defenses to recent developments in air warfare. NATO’s integrated air defense is still designed for classic threats — piloted aviation, ballistic and cruise missiles — not ubiquitous, cheap, versatile strike and decoy UAVs.

It’s not promising that three years after Shaheds were introduced in September–October 2022, NATO air defense behaved as if nothing had changed. The way the U.S. — Trump — responded, saying it might be an accident or mistake, infuriated Poland for obvious reasons.

That response isn’t conducive to deterrence. Without full U.S. support, we can imagine Russia provoking from Belarus with hundreds of strike and decoy UAVs; Poland and the Baltic states would respond, but without full U.S. backing, they might not strike the threat meaningfully.

Trump’s response creates opportunities for Russia’s further provocations.

Is it possible the drone incursion into Poland was also an attempt to big up the rather timid Zapad exercise? What was the message Zapad 2025 was designed to convey?

The major purpose of Zapad was to deter Western direct intervention on Ukraine’s behalf in the Russia–Ukraine war. Unfortunately, it worked and had an effect. There’s evidence that Iskander systems were deployed in Kaliningrad oblast pointing toward Poland. The purpose is intra-war deterrence — to ensure the West maintains a cautious, risk-averse approach.

We can speculate: was the purpose to make Poland nervous so it would ask for more classic air defense to be deployed in Poland — thus Ukraine gets less from partners in terms of Patriots? Not very effective against UAVs, but Poland made such statements anyway.

It’s classic gray-zone probing to see the response and learn lessons. I think they saw a difference between Poland and the U.S., and that was a major disappointment for many Polish politicians, especially conservatives who banked on the political connection with U.S. conservatives — President Karol Nawrocki's visit to the U.S., nice pictures — and then Poland is attacked and Trump says it was a mistake, maybe an accident.

That isn’t good for deterrence and undermined those symbolic photos and statements of unity in Washington. Russia likely probed how Trump would respond. We'll see how Russia interpreted the episode and the U.S. response.

Has NATO reached out to Ukraine for advice and support on bolstering its counter-drone capability?

The idea has been raised, and we’ll probably be contacted. Whether it’s on a Ukraine–NATO basis, I don’t know. It might be on a Poland–Ukraine bilateral basis, because defense of Poland is first and foremost about Poland.

There is JATEC — the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center, a NATO-Ukraine “civil-military organization” based in Bydgoszcz, Poland. It opened this year. It’s a mechanism of mutual learning. But the most probable outcome is multiple tracks: bilateral Ukraine–Poland; other bilateral tracks with NATO countries; maybe NATO through JATEC; and also Ukraine–European Union, because the EU has funding mechanisms that might be used. With that funding, counter-drone technology could be produced at scale in NATO countries and then deployed by NATO soldiers along the eastern flank.

How is Ukraine holding up? The current nightmare seems likely to continue for years. How are you doing in terms of internal cohesion? Any changes compared to last year?

It’s a challenge — as in any democratic country, especially one in transition. We’re not an authoritarian state where a leader commands and people just follow. Recent surveys show confusion and ambiguity: on one hand, people are open to negotiations and a compromise settlement, but want it mainly on Ukrainian terms — they’re not ready to sacrifice anything. At the same time, we understand it’s an existential war and there’s no choice not to fight.

Ukraine isn’t being offered a realistic, acceptable exit option. The choice is difficult: continue fighting or agree to Russian terms, which are unacceptable. It’s a trap: you don’t have the luxury not to fight, given the Russian threat and sacrifices, but continuing is more challenging. Mobilization is still an issue. External support is problematic, as the recent changes in U.S. stance has showed.

It’s quite a challenge for Ukrainian political and military leadership; I don’t envy them. They must orchestrate a democratic society with limited hard backing from partners for a continuous war of attrition and exhaustion. It’s the most unenviable position in the world to be Ukraine’s highest political and military leadership right now.

Is it time to sober up and say the so-called peace talks or peace efforts aren’t serious, given there’s been no progress for half a year and no apparent willingness by Russia to pursue peace?

I don’t think Europe — or Ukraine — has the luxury of dropping involvement in the peace process under the aegis of the Trump administration. We’ll continue to be involved. The major problem is that Putin is sticking to the illusion of absolute victory. He wants a victory that justifies all the sacrifices and shortcomings. He wants ultimate triumph, dictating all the terms.

The current front line dynamics — no breakthrough, luckily, but no stabilization either — don’t meet the necessary precondition for true negotiations.

In the Korean War, negotiations went on for two years with no result, with simultaneous fighting and suffering. The biggest problem is that battlefield and strategic dynamics aren’t the ones that would make Putin stop in the short term.

He always has, by default, the option of freezing, but he preserves the desire to create a situation — through pressure and exhaustion — where he can dictate terms. Whether he’ll succeed, even he doesn’t know, though his generals promise breakthroughs in short order, according to the media.

Until battlefield dynamics change — with a stabilized front line — and the strategic dynamics change — with major European pledges toward Ukraine and a less risk-averse approach — there’s no ground for real negotiations and real compromise that wouldn’t come solely at the expense of Ukrainian existential interests.

Published by The Baltic Sentinel