Mykola Bielieskov, senior analyst at the CBA Initiatives Center, was interviewed by the Kyiv Independent’s Kateryna Hodunova. The conversation explores Ukraine’s recent territorial gains, the growing role of drones and robotic systems, the possibility of a frozen conflict, and whether either side can sustain the war for years to come. 

Below are the main points from the conversation.

Advancing overall is quite complicated right now. It's not something that's going to change the war decisively in Ukraine's favor. 

Strategically, it's also quite important because it undermined the narrative that Russia spreads, that sooner or later, given the preponderance of resources in absolute numbers, it's going to prevail.

As far as I understand, we have a plan to cut Russian inroads because there are sometimes so-called tentacles and forms within this infiltration process. The plan is to exploit this weak point of Russian infiltration tactics and improve the tactical situation where conditions are proper. And with this, maybe to make Russians play our games and by our rules. So to make them redeploy their forces instead of being forced by the Russian active advances to redeploy our forces.

We have quite a good background to do this tactical improvement of the situation.

The battle for Pokrovsk started in August 2024. So it took the Russians more than a year and a lot of losses to capture the remnants of the settlement.

We now discuss positive developments for Ukraine, but all these adjustments and improvements do not mean that the frontline is fully stabilized. There are still a number of accesses along the front line where Russians are trying to advance and have some local success. One of them is Pokrovsk direction, or it's better to say Dobropillia direction right now, also around Konstantynivka to the east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russians try to fully capture Rodynske to create conditions for further advance toward Dobropillia. Also, they want to advance to the northwest from Pokrovsk through Hryshyne, basically.

Otherwise, their goal is to capture the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. And with these two cities, they declare they have fully captured the Donetsk region. But right now it's about creating conditions for eventual capture.

The situation is better now than it was at the beginning of the year, given the counterattacks we've done. And since Russians don't have an absolute advantage in manpower, it's a relative advantage. They can’t simultaneously advance everywhere; they need to prioritize. So they simply don't have enough forces to simultaneously advance in Donetsk region, in Zaporizhzhia region, and also in Dnipropetrovsk region.

For more than three years, we have debated whether or not Russia would dare to call another open mobilization. There is still an option, and we need to take it into account and proceed from the worst-case scenario.

But as far as I understand, political risks for the official regime are bigger than the advantage of any open mobilization. So they would try to postpone this decision to the fullest possible extent.

There is a broader tendency to increase the range of attacks. The chances of being fixed and destroyed within 15 kilometers from the notional ground zero are almost 100%. Right now, both wing-type attack UAVs, FPV with fiber-optic guidance, tend to attack targets at 40–50 kilometers.

We see the Ukrainian mid-strike campaign intensifying at ranges of 100+ kilometers. So the front line and the kill zone tend to increase. Ukrainian engineering troops and the Special Transport Directorate place these nests around major roads because the threat of being targeted even at a range of 30–40 km is quite high.

There are more and more incidents where unmanned ground vehicles actually perform not only support but also combat functions.

With this rate of evolution of unmanned ground vehicles, I think in the second half of the year these incidents will multiply, where robotic platforms will be the first line of defense, and only then humans will be the second line of defense. We are moving in this direction quite quickly.

To determine the target, we use different kinds of reconnaissance means — optical intelligence, electronic intelligence, and even human intelligence. You need to verify the target, you need to guarantee that if specific weaponry is used, then your chances of success are good, and then we use mostly UAVs that evolved from the strategic strike systems.

We have a case where you can use a platform that was designed for strikes above 500 km at a range of 20 to 300 km. Basically, it's FP2. It's one of the main means of middle-strike.

We prioritize different types of targets, but 50% of them are air defense.

We use the fact that there is a so-called radio horizon, and Starlink communication allows us to fly really low beyond the radio horizon. Thus, we destroy dozens of different classic surface missiles.

We also create corridors for further mid-strikes, where we target warehouses, locomotives with fuel and ammo, FSB headquarters, and a number of instances.

Before the beginning of this year, we mostly relied on kamikaze UAVs, looking close to the Russian Lancet. And they also had limits on the range, because usually it was less than 100 kilometers.

Now we can target Russia at 100 kilometers, 150 kilometers, or 200 kilometers.

So this campaign has intensified again. Every two weeks, there are 20–30 different targets verified that we destroy along the front line in southern Ukraine and eastern Ukraine.

Russia still has an advantage because they do so-called combined attacks, relying on both UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles. Unfortunately, our capability in this case is limited. So we can't do, at scale, classic combined attacks at the proper range to affect the European part of Russia, where zero economic activities are conducted, and the population areas are settled.

We're still limited by our means, but in one-way attack UAVs, we are now at parity, roughly speaking.

We leveled the playing field, and the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, supported financially by our partners from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, can produce a comparable amount of one-way attack UAVs as Russia employs against Ukraine.

The President mentioned five different scenarios, but probably the ones that might be realized. If Russia indeed had some spare capacity of troops, there is already ample opportunity to employ it along the current front line. 

Unfortunately, there is a chance that there will be some local activity along the bordering Chernihiv region; for instance, we can't exclude this from the Bryansk region of Russia. But they don't have enough manpower to simultaneously pin Ukrainian forces and deflect a major chunk of Ukrainian forces from southern and eastern Ukraine, and then advance in southern and eastern Ukraine. Plus, their recruitment rate has now decreased a little bit. Plus, we kill and wound more than they recruit, so their ability to use this relative advantage of manpower decreases.

Even if Belarus is involved again, the geography of the conduct of operations, plus the way technologies evolve, won't give Russia a huge advantage.

Politically, it would be risky for Lukashenko because right now he's trying to do a kind of balancing act. He is in dialogue with US, he freed some political prisoners, and he wants to have an active dialogue with US, and to a lesser extent with Europe. And all these chances for dialogue would evaporate if he were involved in this kind of stuff. Then the limits of Ukrainian action towards Belarus would be lifted. We are talking about economic, some specific economic capabilities, economic enterprises, and major Belarusian facilities might be attacked very easily.

Because, in a certain sense, they are already complicit in aggression against Ukraine when they gave their territory in 2022, when Belarusian airspace is used from time to time to attack Ukraine, or when some equipment is installed on Belarusian territory that helps guide certain UAVs.

We do our best to limit this involvement of Minsk.

We made a huge leap forward in air defense by means of interceptor UAVs. They still do 30–35% of the interceptions overall. And we strengthened defenses in Chernihiv region. It's quite visible from recent attacks. But they can be bypassed through central Ukraine, for instance.

There is still a problem, and it's more of a problem of defense against classic means of attack against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This is a major concern for Ukraine because every second statement by Zelenskyy is now dedicated to anti-ballistic missile defense. We anticipate a competition for interceptor missiles, given the consumption during the US-Iran war. So we can alleviate this competition, but there is no guarantee that every ballistic missile launched against Kyiv or other urban areas would be destroyed.

It's a good boost for Ukraine to start, maybe jointly with our partners, some work to develop indigenous anti-ballistic missile defense. It's a long-term project, but we probably should move in this direction.

In certain cases, interceptor drones can shoot down missiles, especially in a so-called meeting course. It can be done if you know the trajectory. 

In terms of interceptor UAVs, it’s very human-intensive stuff. We need UAV operators basically in proper quantity to employ them, and also artificial intelligence integrated at scale, and so-called coverage of the country.

So when we understand the situation properly, we can envision the situation where interceptor UAVs shoot down not 30–35% or 40% of all Shaheds, but maybe two-thirds of all Shaheds. 

There are still gaps in radar coverage of Ukraine's territory.  The Rada radar, which is used, has coverage of just 20 kilometers. If Russians properly calculate the flight path, and if it's not above the active front line, but through Cherniv, Sumy region, Kharkiv region, or through southern Ukraine, I mean like the Black Sea.

Putin is living in his own world, and he assesses the situation differently.

The problem is how we send proper signals and how he reads these proper signals, because there won't be a major breakthrough along the front line right now, and Russians won't be able to capture major Ukrainian territories.

On the battlefield, their prospects are very bleak. But since Putin is very insulated in terms of the information he receives and his interpretation of current developments, he might stick to his distorted worldview and ideas that democracy is weaker in terms of willpower. And this distorted reason for the situation might preserve his way in the hope that if he just prolongs the war, the situation in the future might change radically in Russia's favor.

There is a good assessment by the Netherlands' military intelligence that right now, with most of the forces concentrated on aggression against Ukraine, the chances of another large-scale aggressive action against the Baltic state are close to zero. But simultaneously, the Baltic states prepare for the worst-case scenario.

Our partner states are fearful of a scenario where there is a cessation of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia, but Russian capability is still intact and can be redeployed. And thus they aid Ukraine as much as possible to pin down these forces here. 

The Baltic states also proceed from the assumption that Ukraine is their first line of defense. Successful Ukrainian defenses guarantee that they are never attacked.

The biggest interstate war after 1945 was the Iran-Iraq War. It lasted eight years, and in a certain sense, resembled our war because neither side was able to decisively turn the situation in its favor militarily. It was a stalemate. It was very fierce positional fighting. So it's the fifth year of such intensity.

Unfortunately, Russia still has the capability to sustain fighting for some time. We also have the capability to sustain fighting. Hopefully, it won't last eight years.

Actually, there are solid chances that this war is going to end with another framework that would just freeze the current front line. 

When Zelenskyy said (probably in October or November 2025) that the frontline should be the starting point of negotiation, it was the most direct statement he could make in terms of being ready to freeze the conflict line if the other side is ready. The problem is that Russia is not ready. 

Putin can't easily agree to another freezing because he needs to demonstrate something for such a rate of losses, as if they were not able to conquer ever Donetsk region in this wartime framework.

So for Ukraine, it won't be an ideal framework, but we are talking about such a framework where Ukraine is not going to sacrifice its security and sovereignty. Because, unlike 2014–2015, Russia is first asking for major territorial concessions when they claim territories but are not able to conquer them, plus major geopolitical concessions. The Ukrainian goal is to guarantee that Russia is not able to dictate these terms, while recovering temporarily lost territories in a short order of time is also quite difficult for Ukraine to envision.